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Abstract
Traditional analyses of competition policy assume that firms operate in per-
fect credit markets. We argue that imperfections in credit markets should be
taken into account, and show one channel by which accounting for financial
conditions could alter the welfare effects of a merger. In line with empirical
evidence, we posit that the presence of financial distress might diminish price
competition by reducing firms’ willingness to undertake long-term investments
in their customer base. Mergers that reduce the probability of financial distress
can induce the merging firms to compete more fiercely for customers, thus partly
offsetting the traditional effects of an increase in market power. We use this
framework to derive implications for competition policy.
∗We are grateful for comments by Jonathan Baker (our discussant) and the other participants
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Northwestern University School of Law.
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1 Introduction
The recent financial crisis has brought to the fore of the debate the question whether
competition policy should take financial factors into account. By and large, the
current practice (as well as the theory) of competition policy abstracts from the
financial side, and is mostly predicated on the simplifying view that firms have access
to perfect capital markets. For instance, economists traditionally frame the social
desirability of mergers in terms of Williamson’s (1968) tradeoff between efficiency
gains and loss of competition resulting from the merger. In this paper, we explore
how this tradeoff for policy makers is affected by considerations related to the financial
status of the merging firms.
Much of the extant literature on how financial health should affect competition
policy focuses on the failing firm defense and is based on considerations about the ex
post consequences of firm failure on future market structure and consumer welfare.1
In contrast, the effects we are concerned with operate on firm strategy through the ex
ante incentives of the fear of financial failure. In this paper we focus on one particular
channel through which financial factors affect the competitive impact of a merger.2
In our model, firms face some risk of insolvency, and a merger tends to mitigate that
risk. In order to isolate the ex ante channel, we initially focus on a model in which all
of the competition for customers occurs before any failure. We show that the reduced
likelihood of insolvency might induce a firm to compete more aggressively, and can
reverse the traditional competitive effects of a merger.
The specific model we consider is one in which consumers have switching costs,
and thus firms face a tradeoff between current cash flow and future profits. Because
customers are reluctant to switch suppliers, each firm may be able to increase its
current cash flow by raising its current prices at the cost of future sales and profits. In
this context, we introduce financial imperfections by allowing the firms to be subject
1We refer to McFarland and Nelson (2008) for an up-to-date legal account of the main issues.
2As discussed in Section 2, financial factors affect product market competition in a number of
ways. Notably, financial factors can affect a firm’s attitude towards risk and its effective discount
rate. In turn, the firm’s risk attitude and discount rate affect competitive conduct. A merger is
likely to directly and indirectly alter the financial constraints faced by firms
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to the possibility of financial distress and bankruptcy.
The presence of financial distress motivates firms to maximize short-term profits
for two reasons. First, the possibility that a firm might fail increases the effective
discount rate on future earnings from that firm. Second, the possibility that increased
current profits might actually forestall liquidation increases the value of profits in the
current period, again increasing the effective discount rate. Because firms in financial
distress discount their future profits, they have an incentive to increase current cash
flow by raising their prices. We show that the firm treats future profits it expects from
a new customer in the same way it treats cost reductions in the firm’s maximization
function. A merger that makes it less likely that the firm will fail due to insufficient
cash flow increases the relative value of these future profits, and this functions like
an efficiency.
We show how to estimate the magnitude of this “financial efficiency” as a function
of how much profit current customers are expected to bring the firm in the future and
the relative increase in the survival probability of the firm. We show that if regulators
wish to prevent any merger that raises prices they may treat this “financial efficiency”
just like a technological efficiency from a merger. However, in contrast to Farrell and
Shapiro (1990), who find that when there are technological synergies a price decrease
post merger is a sufficient, but not necessary condition for a merger to be welfare
improving, we find that when the merger creates purely financial efficiencies, a price
decrease is both necessary and sufficient.
For the sake of concreteness, we focus our analysis to the case in which switching
costs are sufficiently high to preclude any consumer from switching in the second
period. However, the logic of the model should apply to any situation where a cus-
tomer base or market share has substantial value to the firm. Our results apply to
industries in which firms view a customer base to be a core asset that they can draw
down by raising prices, increasing current revenue at the cost of future market share
and profits. On the other hand, there might be some industries, particularly durable
goods where the effects we describe would have the opposite effect. If current sales
reduce future demand and future profit, financial distress removes a disciplining force
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and makes sales in the current period more attractive, thus inducing firms to compete
more aggressively.3 In either case, we believe that competition policy makers may
wish to consider the incentive effects of financial distress when considering proposed
mergers.
2 Literature
Since Brander and Lewis (1986), a sizable theoretical literature has investigated the
effects of a firm’s capital structure on competitive conduct. Focusing on Cournot
(quantity) competition, they show that a firm’s incentives to produce increases in its
level of debt. Intuitively, because the firm is the residual claimant for high returns,
but debt holders are the residual claimants for low returns, debt makes the firm’s
payoff convex in the returns. Given that an increase in quantity increases the risk-
iness of returns, debt effectively commits the firm to produce a higher quantity for
any quantity expected by the competitors. In turn, rivals respond by reducing their
quantities (strategic substitutes), to the benefit of the firm. As shown by Showal-
ter (1995), debt is also a desirable commitment when firms compete à la Bertrand
(prices), provided the uncertainty is on the demand side. In this case, an increase
in debt induces the firm to weigh high-demand states more because of the limited
liability effect, and in those states higher prices are optimal. In turn, rivals respond
by also raising their prices (strategic complements).
Building on Klemperer (1987) and (1995), Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) model
competition with switching costs in the presence of capital market imperfections.4
They note that in industries with switching costs, firms which face no risk of liqui-
dation have incentives to raise prices during booms, and lower prices during busts,
but that firms which are externally financed may have incentives to increase prices
when their survival is in doubt. Our analysis builds on a similar model, but focuses
on the price effect of mergers, thus extending Werden (1996) to a setting in which
3For example, Busse (2002) presents evidence that airlines cut prices so as to temporarily increase
sales and cash flow in response to liquidity crises
4See also Gottfries (1991).
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the merger generates a financial synergy, corresponding to a reduction in the proba-
bility of financial distress. Thus, we contribute an analysis of how competition policy
should take into account financial constraints.
Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) also present empirical evidence that supermarket
chains that are externally financed do indeed increase their prices during busts, when
the chains are more likely to be in financial distress. Asplund, Eriksson, and Strand
(2005) offer additional evidence consistent with the role played by switching costs for
the intensity of price competition.
In the banking literature, Perotti and Suarez (2002) study how competition policy
affects banks’ incentives to undertake speculative lending, which increase short-run
profits at the cost of increasing the probability of failure. They show that banks’
speculative lending decisions are strategic substitutes when a lenient merger control
policy allows a surviving bank to merge with a failing competitor and thereby obtain
(temporary) monopoly profits. Intuitively, prudent lending is then optimal in reply
to speculative lending by the competitor. In our model, instead, merger policy affects
ex ante competitive structure, rather than speculative lending. In addition, we ab-
stract from the ex post benefits from increased market power that firms might derive
following a merger.
3 Model
Suppose we have N firms competing in an industry with switching costs. In the first
period potential customers choose between purchasing from any one of the N firms,
or not purchasing at all. We suppose that firms face a linear demand function given
by xi1 = a− bpi1 +
∑
j 6=i γpj1. We note that the diversion ratio (equal to the fraction
of lost sales of one firm that are captured by a second firm following an increase in
the price by the first firm) between any two firms is γ/b, and that the total inside
diversion ratio is γ(N − 1)/b.
In the second period, consumers face switching costs that are sufficiently large so
they do not consider switching firms during that period. They buy from their current
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firm if the price is less than R, and otherwise leave the market. For the purposes
of simplicity we assume that firms face no new customers in the second period, thus
sales in the second period are given by
xi2 =
{
xi1 p ≤ R
0 p > R.
Given this structure, firms in the second period will all charge R, so profits in the
second period are xi1(R− ci). The total profit for firm i is thus given by
Πi = πi1 + πi2 = (a− bpi1 +
∑
j 6=i
γpj1)(pi1 − c+R− c).
Given this expression, the first order condition for the first period price is








j 6=i γpj1 + b(c− (R− c))
2b
. (1)
We note here that the future profit from a new customer (R−c) enters into the pricing
function just like a reduction in cost. Solving for the equilibrium, we immediately
obtain
pi1 =
a+ b(c− (R− c))
2b− (N − 1)γ
.
4 Exogenous Distress
In this section we model how firms’ pricing decisions are affected by presence of
financial distress, as captured by the probability that the firm does not survive into
the second period. We suppose that firm i is in some distress in period 1, and imagine
that there is only probability φi that i will survive into period 2. Following Chevalier
and Scharfstein (1996) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) we assume that if the firm
fails it does so because the firm is unable to make a scheduled fixed debt payment,
and that anticipating this failure, the firm’s managers are able to expropriate the first
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period’s profits. At first we assume that the forces that determine whether or not
the firm survives are entirely beyond its control, so the likelihood of survival does not
depend on its sales in either period. When we say the firm does not survive, we do
not necessarily mean that the firm liquidates, what our analysis requires is that if the
firm does not survive (goes bankrupt), the first period decision makers do not see any
value from the firm’s future profits. This uncertainty about survival has the effect of
causing the firm to discount the future profits from new customers.
Proposition 1 Holding all else equal, the firm’s price is increasing in the degree of
financial distress (i.e. the price is decreasing in the probability of survival)
Proof : Due to the fact that the manager only realizes period 2 profits if the firm
survives, the firm is now maximizing
Πi = πi1 + φiπi2 = (a− bpi1 +
∑
j 6=i
γpj1)(pi1 − c+ φi(R− c)).








We see that holding all else constant, the effect of decreasing the survival prob-
ability, φi, is to increase the price. The intuition is that the future marginal profits
from of an additional customer, R− c, could be seen as equivalent to a cost decrease
in selling to this customer. Diminishing the likelihood of firm survival diminishes the
likelihood of realizing this cost decrease, leading to a price increase.
4.1 Effect of Merger
Suppose that there is a proposed merger between firm i and firm j, and this merger
would be completed prior to sales in period 1. Suppose also that the merger does
not lead to any technological efficiencies or changes in available products. If not for
the issue of financial distress, the effect of the merger would be to increase prices for
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both products, because each division of the merged firm would no longer consider
sales diverted to the other division as lost sales. However here we show that, if the
merger partially alleviates the financial distress, the merger can actually lead to a
price decrease. For the sake of simplicity we will assume that prior to the merger
both firms i and j had the same likelihood of survival and that due to the merger the
likelihood of survival increases from φi to φM .
The merger could increase the likelihood of survival for several reasons. Firstly,
the risks that the merging firms face may not be perfectly correlated, so a merger
might lessen the risk of failure due to a risk pooling effect. Each firm may not be
strong enough to survive a bad outcome on its own, but a merged firm may be strong
enough to survive as long as both firms do not receive this bad outcome. Similarly,
a firm that relies on short term financing is likely to have relationships with only a
few banks, if all of those banks are impacted by a systemic liquidity crises, none of
the banks may be willing to roll over any of their loans. The acquiring firm may very
well have relationships with some different banks who might not be suffering from
the crisis to the same degree, and thus might be willing to roll over the target firms
loans.
Secondly, the future prospects of the merged firm are likely to be brighter, thus
the merged firm may be seen as more creditworthy and face a softer liquidity con-
straint. Finally the merger may involve a well capitalized firm merging with a poorly
capitalized rival, and the acquiring firm may be sufficiently well capitalized to face
little risk of failure.5
In the second period, the merged firm will continue to charge R, for both goods
because there are no new customers, and the diversion ratio for old customers is 0,
since old customers buy from their old firm or leave the market. However, the merger
will likely lead to a change in price in the first period. To introduce our result, we
5This last scenario does not precisely fit the model, because we have assumed for the sake of
simplicity that the merging firms are identical. If we have a well-capitalized firm merging with a
firm in financial distress, the merger might lead the well-capitalized firm to increase prices, while
the poorly-capitalized firm lowers prices. The approach developed in this paper could nonetheless
be used to predict the effect of the merger on average prices and welfare.
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define d = γ
b
as the diversion ratio between the merging firms, and Ψ = pi1−c+φi(R−c)
φi(R−c)
as the ratio between total expected profit from a new customer and the portion that
is expected to be realized in the second period. Note that Ψ will be greater than one
as long as pi1 > c, but if pi1 < c, that is to say if firms find it profitable to subsidize
purchases in the first period in order to reap higher profits in the second, then Ψ will
be lower than 1.
Whether we expect a price increase or decrease from the merger depends upon
the change in survival probability, the diversion ratio, and the fraction of profit per
customer that is realized in the second period. Specifically we have:





Proof : Let us use δ to refer to the difference in the second period price between the
merged and unmerged scenarios.
In the first period, the new first order condition is








k 6=i γpk1 + γ(pj1 − c+ φM(R− c) + b(c− φM(R− c))
2b
. (3)
The change in price is given by
δi =
∑
k 6=i γδk1 + γ(pj1 − c+ φM(R− c))
2b
− φM − φi
2
(R− c).
By symmetry, we know the firm will charge the same for goods i and j, and a necessary
and sufficient condition for δi to be positive is
∂pi =
γ(pj1 − c+ φi(R− c))
2b
− (b− γ)(φM − φi)
2b
(R− c) > 0.









We note that in this linear demand system, the actions of the competitors are
strategic complements, so if the merged firm is charging lower prices for its goods,
all of the competitors will charge lower prices as well. There are two opposing effects
from the merger. First, there is the standard competitive effect of the merger, the
fact that the firm faces a lower effective elasticity since some of the customers who
choose not to buy product i choose to buy product j instead. The second effect is the
fact that new customers have more value to the merged firm because the merged firm
is more likely to survive, φM > φi. Because these new customers have more value to
the merged firm, the merged firm competes more vigorously to obtain customers in
the first period.
As expected, increasing the diversion ratio implies that it is more likely that the
merger will lead to a price increase. Decreasing Ψ, and increasing the relative im-
portance of future profits makes the increase in survival probability more important,
and thus makes it more likely that the merger will lead to a price decrease. Likewise,
increasing φM , or decreasing φi, increases the survival effect of the merger, and makes
a price decrease more likely.
4.2 Welfare Effects
In their seminal work on the welfare effect of a merger Farrell and Shapiro examine
mergers between firms that compete in a Cournot equilibrium, and show that an
increase in output (and a decrease in price) is a sufficient condition for an increase in
welfare. In contrast, in our model a decrease in prices is a necessary and sufficient
condition for an increase in welfare in the first period. The difference is that the
efficiencies in the type of merger examined by Farrell and Shapiro reduce the social
cost of producing the good. If output is decreased slightly (and prices are slightly
increased), this indicates a decrease in consumer surplus. However, it is still possible
that reduced social cost from production outweighs the decrease in consumer surplus,
and the merger increases welfare. In the model examined in the paper the efficiency
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from the increased likelihood of survival is not a production efficiency, it does not
actually reduce the social costs of production. Rather it is an allocative efficiency as
it comes from more closely aligning the incentives of the firm with social efficiency.
In essence, because of the merger, the management of the firm is able to capture
a greater fraction of the future surplus from each captured customer, and thus its
incentives are more closely aligned with society. However, the merger also increases
the market power of the firm, increasing the incentive to raise price, leading to more
deadweight loss. Since these two effects both operate purely on the pricing decision
of the firm, whether the merger increases or decreases social welfare depends purely
on whether the merged firm’s price moves closer to or farther from the social cost.
We start by noting that consumer surplus S is a decreasing function of the price
vector p, and Si(p) ≡ ∂S/∂pi = −xi1. The total producers’ profit is just
∑
i≤N πi =∑
i≤N xi1(p+R− 2c). Recall that we are assuming that if a firm fails, its productive
assets are purchased prior to the next period, and that the purchaser of its assets
will supply to the captive customer base, so there are no real effects from failure.
Although failure may affect who (i.e. debt or equity) receives the profits in the
second period, total enterprise profits are not affected. Without loss of generality, let
j and k represent the firms that are merging. Suppose that the merger leads to a
price decrease so pM < pj.
The marginal change in social welfare from a price increase for good j is
dW
dpj





(−xi + (xi − b(pi +R− 2c)) (5)
Note that (pj +R− 2c) > 0, and (pi +R− 2c) > 0, otherwise the firms would not be
profitable, similarly, we recall that dpi/dpj > 0. Thus dW/dpj < 0. The same result
also holds for dW/dpk. We conclude that any merger which decreases prices for the




In the previous section, we assumed that the probability of survival was not affected
by the pricing decisions of the firm. In this section we allow for the possibility that the
probability of survival depend upon how much cash on hand the firm has at the end
of the first period, and the firm may take this into account. Specifically, we imagine
that the firm faces a stochastic cash requirement to survive into the second period.
The firm relies on callable short term financing, and that due to forces beyond control
of the firm, at the end of period some banks call in a portion of their loans. Let z be
the amount of short term debt called by the banks, we assume that if the firm cannot
pay back the called loans it fails, so the firm needs to have at least z available as cash
in order to continue to operate in the second period. We imagine that z is not known
in advance, rather it is a random variable distributed according to the cumulative
distribution function G, so G(z) represents the likelihood that the amount of cash
demanded will be equal to or less than z. We assume that the distressed firm has no
available cash prior to the start of the first period, so the firm’s survival is dependent
upon the first period profits exceeding the cash needed to operate. The firm survives
if πi1 > z, so the likelihood of survival is G(πi1). If the firm lacks the cash necessary
to operate, it enters bankruptcy and is either liquidated or reorganized. 6
Suppose the total debt of the firm is L, and assume that L < πi2, so the manager
of the firm would never prefer to expropriate the available cash at the end of the first
period if there is enough to pay off the fraction of the loan that is called. If the firm is
able to pay z at the end of the first period, it will be able to pay L− z in the second
period, and pay off its debts entirely. Thus if the firm fails, the manager’s payoff
is πi1, and if it succeeds the payoff is πi1 + πi2 − L, so the firm wishes to maximize
πi1 +G(πi1)(πi2 − L).
Proposition 3 Holding all else equal, the firm’s price is increasing in the degree of
financial distress, and also increasing in the sensitivity of survival to profits, g(πi1).
6In this simple model our results do not depend upon what happens to the firm when it cannot
make payments, it is only necessary to assume that conditional on bankruptcy, future profits are of
no value to the pre-bankruptcy decision makers.
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For the sake of brevity, we use ζ to refer to the ratio between the weight of the second
period profit and first period profit in a firm’s maximization problem. Thus ζ i =
G(πi1)
1+g(πi1)(πi2−Li) . Plugging in our linear demand equations, our first order condition
becomes
(xi1 − b(pi1 − ci)) + bζ i(R− c) = 0.




j 6=i pj1 + b(c− ζ i(R− c))
2b
. (6)
We note that price is decreasing in ζ i and ζ i is increasing in the probability of
survival, G(πi1), so it is decreasing in financial distress. We note also that ζ i is
decreasing in the sensitivity of survival to profits, g(πi1).
QED
To compare this to our expression for pricing with exogenous distress, we first note
that G(πi1) is the probability of survival, so it is the analog of φi in the exogenous
failure model. Looking at our expression for ζ i, we see that ζ i < G(πi1), implying
that compared to a firm facing the same probability of exogenous failure, a firm facing
endogenous failure will discount the future more, charging higher prices because it
values future profits less. When survival into the future is dependent upon current
cash flow, this gives an additional reason for the firm to focus on current cash flow
as opposed to future profitability. The firm both discounts future profits by the
likelihood they are never realized, and places more value on current cash flow as a
means of realizing that future profit.
5.1 Effects of Merger under Endogeneity
Considering the endogeneity of firm survival can make it more likely that a merger
reduces prices in the first period, particularly when the merger makes the probability
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of failure insensitive to future increases in profit by reducing any substantial likelihood
of firm failure. We suppose there is a post merger survival function GM , so that after
the merger, the probability of survival is given by GM(πM1). Analogously to our




Our new test for a price increase from the merger is given by the following propo-
sition:
Proposition 4 The merger will lead to a price increase if and only if





pi1 − c+ ζ i(R− c)
ζ i(R− c)
. (7)
This expression is similar to expression (4), but the last term pi1−c+ζi(R−c)
ζi(R−c)
is now
the ratio of total profits to expected future profits, with both terms being discounted
by the firm’s effective discount rate, (which considers both the fact that the firm
might not survive, and the fact that period 1 cash flow might influence that survival).
The new expression for δ is
δi =
∑
k 6=i γδk + γ(pj1 − c− ζM(R− c))
2b
− ζM − ζ i
2
(R− c). (8)
In general, whether considering the endogeneity of the firm’s survival increases
or decreases the likelihood that the merger leads to a price increase is ambiguous.
If we place no restrictions on the shape of the survival functions Gi and GM , it is
easy to construct parameters where a merger increases the likelihood of survival yet
leads to a negative financial inefficiency. Specifically, suppose that absent the merger
the firm is likely to survive only if a discrete exogenous event such as a regulatory
change occurs, but that the merger strengthens the combined firm enough so that it
just might survive absent that change if it is able to substantially increase its short
term profits. Thus the merger shifts the firm into a more sensitive region of the
survival function, so that gM(πM1)πM2 > gi(πi1)(πi1 + πi2 − Li). See Figure 1a. As
long as absolute likelihood of survival is not increased too much it can be the case
that GM (R−c)
1+gM (πM1)(πM1+πM2−LM )
< Gi(R− c)1 + gi(πi1)(πi1 + πi2 − Li), implying that the










Figure 1a Figure 1b
G (z)




G    (z)M
Figure 1: Probability of survival as a function of first period cash flow. Dotted lines
represent the survival function for the merged firm. Note that g(z) is the slope of
G(z)
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the price increase from the merger will actually be greater than that expected merely
from the loss of competition.
More broadly, if the merger does not substantially decrease the sensitivity of
survival to profit, making survival endogenous decreases the impact from the financial
efficiency from merger. If the increase in survival probability from a proportionate
increase in cash flow is roughly the same pre and post merger,7 so that gi(πi1)(πi1 +
πi2−Li) ≈ gM(πM1)(πM1 + πM2−LM), both pre and post merger firms discount the
future by approximately the same additional factor of 1+gM(πM1)(piM1 +πM2−LM),
and the magnitude of the financial efficiency due to the reduced probability of failure
is decreased by this factor as well.
In any case, considering the endogeneity of survival increases the maximum possi-
ble magnitude of the ‘financial efficiency’, which occurs when the merger removes any
possibility of failure. In this case, GM(πM1) = 1 and gM(πM1) = 0, so the magnitude
of the efficiency would be (1 − G(πi1)
(1+g(πi1)πi2)
)(R − c), which is clearly greater than the
maximum efficiency with exogenous mergers, which is (1−G(πi1))(R− c). Speaking
generally, if the merger removes the firm from the region where survival is sensitive to
profit, (as in Figure 1b) considering the endogeneity is likely to increase the financial
efficiency due to mergers, as stated in the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Compare two mergers, one in a scenario where failure is exogenous
(firms i and j), one where failure is endogenous (firm u and v), but both between
firms with the same likelihood of failure, i.e. φi = G(πu1). If all else is held constant,
the merger in the scenario where failure is endogenous is more likely to reduce prices.
7After the merger, the lost profits from firm failure tend to be substantially greater, so that if
the absolute sensitivity of survival to profit (g(π)) is not decreased, the emphasis on current profit
is higher, because the stakes from survival are higher and the firm wants to guarantee its survival.
On the other hand, the merged firm is presumably of a larger scale. so one might expect that the




We have chosen a specific, simple demand function for our analysis, and one might ask
how this affects the robustness of our results. Although the magnitude of a merger
typically depends strongly on the shape of a demand function, as pointed out by
Werden (1996), the sign of the price effect from a merger is typically determined by
a comparison between the margin, the magnitude of the efficiency, and the diversion
ratio.
Following Werden’s (1986) intuition, we can show that our results are robust to
any symmetrical demand system.
Proposition 6 In any symmetrical equilibrium of a symmetrical demand system, the







Proof : Consider a symmetrical model where demand is given by a function xi1(p1)
where p1 is the vector of first period prices and ζ i is the relative weight of the second





(pi1 − c) + ζ i(R− c) = 0.
Consider a merger between i and j that increases the likelihood of survival, or di-
minishes the sensitivity of survival to cash flow so ζM > ζ i. Holding other prices







(pi1 − c) + ζM(R− c)) +
dxj1
dpi1
















is negative, we have
dΠi
dpi1









6.2 Ability to Borrow Against Future Earnings
Our result that making the firm survival endogenous increases the degree to which
the firms discount the future is predicated on the assumption that the firm’s survival
depended only on cash in hand and that it had no ability to finance operations by
borrowing against future earnings. Admittedly, the prospects for future profits might
also enter into the firm’s credit-worthiness and hence its survival. However, because
future profits are inherently uncertain, and any claim on future profits by a creditor
likely introduces moral hazard problems or other constraints on the operation of the
firm, we would expect that an expectation of future profits cannot be fully monetized,
and that a bird in the hand is worth somewhat less than a bird in the bush. Given
our concern with financial crises in this paper, we might expect that expectations of
future earnings are particularly hard to borrow against in times of an economy-wide
liquidity crisis.
We might model the effect of expected future profits on firm survival by supposing
that the likelihood of survival is now G(πi1+λπi2), where λ < 1 is the degree to which









Comparing this expression to the prices with exogenous distress (2) and with the
hard cash on hand constraint (6) we note that although a loose cash in hand constraint
(λ > 0), causes the firm to discount the future less than a hard cash in hand constraint,
as long as future profits are not considered the equivalent of cash on hand (λ < 1),
the firm will discount the future more when survival is made endogenous. Thus the
results regarding the exogenous failure can be seen as a lower bound on the degree to
which financial distress causes the firm to discount the future.
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6.3 Ability to Expropriate
The assumption that the managers of the firm can expropriate all of the cash flow
when the firm is unable to make the payment may appear to be somewhat extreme.
However, as long as managers of the firm are able to obtain some benefits from first-
period profits prior to bankruptcy, the qualitative results will be the same, although
the magnitude of the effect would be lower. As shown by Dasgupta and Titman
(1998), even when managers are effectively barred by covenants from removing any
earnings from the corporation, they may act as if they can.8 The empirical results
of Chevalier and Scharfstein (1996) lend support to the hypothesis that companies
that are in distress increase prices because they place less weight on potential future
earnings.
7 Extension: Future Competition
With the model we have been considering, analyzing consumer welfare analysis is
relatively simple. In the second period, there are no new consumers, and all old
consumers pay R, their reservation price. Thus, old consumers receive no surplus in
the second period, regardless of what happens in the first period, so consumer welfare
is purely dependent on what occurs in the first period. However, this simple analysis
is dependent on the assumption that no new customers enter the market after the
first period, and that old customers are completely indifferent to the prices being
charged by other firms. Because firms do not need to worry about new customers
in the second period, and old customers are captive, the firms’ behavior in the first
period does not depend on their expectations of competition in the second period.
In this section, we discuss how these results might change in a more complete
model that allowed for competition in the second period. If new customers arrived in
the second period, and the firms were constrained to charge the same to new and old
customers, then expectations of future competitions would affect the firms’ behavior
8The intuition behind Dasgupta and Titman’s (1998) result is that management can essentially
reduce the priority of senior debt by using current cash flow to forestall higher interest rate junior
borrowing at the cost of reducing the likelihood of repaying senior debt.
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in the first period. When the pricing decisions of the competing firms are strategic
complements, as is the case with linear demand, then considering future competition
can slightly decrease the incentive to build a customer base.9 When firm i lowers its
price and gains a customer in the first it has the effect of taking away a fraction of
a potential customer from i’s competitors, decreasing the price they will charge, thus
decreasing i′s future profits. On the other hand, there is an opposing effect; with an
additional old customer in t + 1, firm i can commit to higher prices, which in turn
leads the competitors to charge more. With a linear demand model, the first effect
dominates, but is not very strong unless there are few firms and they are all very close
competitors.10 Because obtaining a new customer tends to reduce the competitors’
prices, the future value of a new customer tends to be a little less than the future
margins from that customer. Considering competition in the future also has some
effect on our analysis of mergers. The major effect is to push the price increase
from the loss of competition into the future, while diminishing any immediate price
increase. Because a merger tends to increase future prices, this increases the future
value of new customers, and has the same effect as a decrease in the cost of serving
new customers.11 This has the effect of diminishing the immediate price increase.
However, if the financial distress is seen as resulting from a transitory crises, than
the financial efficiencies may be transitory too. Thus a merger during a financial crises
might lead to an immediate price decrease due to alleviation of financial distress at
the cost of a future price increase. Whether it is desirable to permit or block a merger
9Pricing decisions are said to be strategic complements if when one firm raises its price, it becomes
more profitable for other firms to raise their price. Firms are said to be strategic substitutes if when
one firm raises its price, it becomes more profitable for the other firms to lower their prices.
10It is possible to quantify this using simulations. In a two period mode where there are the same
number of new customers in both periods, if there are 4 equal firms, and the diversion ratios between
any two firms was .25, and the elasticity of old customers was about one third the elasticity of new
customers, then dπi2/dxi1 would be about 95% of (1−ζpi2)(pi2−ci2). The most extreme case would
be if there were 2 firms, the diversion ratio was 1, and old customers were completely inelastic, in
this case dπi2/dxi1 would only be 1/3 of (1− ζpi2)(pi2 − ci2).
11The anticipated future price increase is seen as a cost increase as long as new customers are
myopic and do not consider future prices of the locked in good when they are making their purchasing
decision. If they fully consider the future price increase in a rational manner, then an anticipated
increase in the future price is seen as an increase in the current price. In either case, the fact that
the merger tends to raise future prices tends to decrease the rise in the current price.
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may depend on the tradeoff between future price increases and current price increases.
It is often recognized that the competitive effects of a merger tend to fade over
time, as the competitive environment tends to revert to a long term equilibrium.
There are some reasons why policy makers should be more concerned with price
increases and output reductions during crises then during times of economic stability
and full employment. Due to sticky prices and other frictions it is quite likely that in
times of crises, inputs (especially labor) might be priced above their social cost. Thus
output restrictions might create dual deadweight losses, the total loss would include
not only the difference between the consumers’ willingness to pay and the firm’s cost
of production, but also the difference between the firm’s cost of production and the
actual social opportunity costs of the input.
One further complication behind a model of future competition is that any judge-
ment of the welfare effects using a such model will depend strongly upon what happens
when a firm fails. Much of these consequences have been discussed extensively in the
literature on the failing firm defense(e.g., McFarland and Nelson (2008)), but there are
some special considerations when switching costs are important. One could imagine
that if a firm fails, it leaves the market completely. In this case, the impact of a firm
failure on consumer welfare is likely to be much more severe than the effects of the
merger. If the firm leaves the market completely, then all remaining firms are likely
to increase their prices. The new customers who would have preferred the old firms
good are forced to purchase goods they desire less and perhaps most importantly, the
old customers are forced to pay switching costs or stop consuming altogether.
Another possibility is that the failed firm’s assets and goodwill are purchased by
one of the surviving firms in the industry. In that case, the failure of the firm has
the same impact on future prices as the merger, but does not generate the ‘financial
efficiency’ from alleviating financial distress that results from a voluntary merger.
Furthermore the merger occurs only in the cases where the firm fails, so any expecta-
tion of future price increase that is conditional on the failure does not result in lower
costs to the firm.
A final possibility is that if the firm fails, its productive assets and goodwill are
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sold to a new entrant. In that case, the major effect of the failure is financial, so
consumers are not hurt by failures. Of course the direct effects of firm failure on
competition is a topic that has been considered before, and understanding of these
possible effects is the foundation for the failing firm defense. The contribution of this
work is the construction of a framework to consider the effects of distress, rather than
failure. For that reason, we believe it is preferable as a baseline for our analysis to
consider the scenario where firm failure is purely financial and the assets of a firm
that failed remain in the market as a new firm.
7.1 Future Competition and Endogenous Failure
In a model where the survival of one firm affects the future profits of another firm,
endogenizing firm failure introduces some complicated strategic effects. To wit, if a
firm is likely to achieve higher profits in the second period if their competitor fails,
and the firm can make this failure more likely by charging lower prices and reducing
their competitor’s cash flow in the first period, this will encourage the firm to lower
prices in the first period. We note again that the incentive to do so depends upon
what happens to the firm that fails. If the impact of failure is purely financial, and
all the manufacturing capacity and customer goodwill of the failed firm, is merely
sold to a new competitor, the extant firms will receive no benefit from a firm failure.
If the firm’s assets are liquidated, and used outside of the industry, on the other
hand, the surviving firms will receive a benefit when the firm fails. Finally, there is
a scenario where the firms could actually be hurt by their competitors failure, if the
manufacturing assets of the failed firm are transferred to a new firm, but this new
firm does not command the goodwill and loyalty of the failed firms old customers,
the new firm will have to compete aggressively to establish a customer base.
In any case, the incentive to underprice so as to drive competitors out of business
is likely to be fairly small unless there are very few firms (i.e., 2 or 3) and the firms
are very close competitors. For one, if the firms are not very close competitors, the
increment to the competitor’s profit when firm i fails is likely to be small compared to
the increment to firm i′s profit when i itself fails. Secondly if the firms are not close
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competitors, any action by a competitor is likely to have much more impact on that
competitor than the firm in distress. If competing firms have an incentive to price
more aggressively in response to a firm in distress, that does it make it less likely that
a merger which alleviates distress will have the immediate effect of lowering prices,
because the alleviation of financial distress diminishes the competitor’s incentive to
drive the firm out of business. On the other hand, the fact that competitors seek
to drive the firm out of business implies that the firm’s failure is likely to lead to
a permanent exit of the firm’s resources from the market, so that a merger which
reduces the likelihood of firm failure is likely to have beneficial long term effects on
consumer welfare.
8 Conclusion
In this paper we have illustrated one way in which imperfections in financial markets
impact the welfare calculus of mergers. We have shown that when firms have some
ability to lock in customers, financial distress might push firms to raise prices to focus
on current profits.Financial distress decreases the value of future profits by decreasing
the likelihood they are realized, and by making the eventual realization of those
profits contingent on current cash flow, financial distress increases the importance
of immediate revenue. When a merger alleviates financial distress, it increases the
firm’s incentive to keep prices low to build up a customer base, and even without
any technological efficiencies from the merger, this might cause the merger to lower
prices overall. Although in our model, switching costs are explicit and substantial,
the general lessons from the model applies to any industry where increasing prices
tends to increase current profits at the cost of future profits.
Of course, one might ask why a firm might be able to obtain financing through a
merger with a competitor but not be able to attract financing from any other source,
such as a merger outside of the industry, or a bank loan or stock offering. Of course
this is a critique that also applies to the failing firm defense. We note that the financial
distress we speak of is particularly likely to occur during a system wide liquidity crises.
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Under these circumstances asymmetric information is likely to present a substantial
obstacle to deal-making if the prospective investors are uncertain about their ability
to accurately assess the prospects of the distressed firms. A firm in the same industry
is likely to be much more confident in their ability to assess the value of the target
firm. Secondly, there may be substantial issues with monitoring, particularly if the
target firm is near the zone of insolvency, when there is likely to be the most conflict
of interest between equity and debt, and management and equity. An acquiring firm
in the same industry is likely to have its own industry knowledge and be more able
to cheaply monitor the target firm. Finally, a firm in the same industry is most likely
to be able to benefit from synergies or other strategic factors.
With this paper, we wish call attention to the question of how competition policy
should take financial factors into account. Our analysis abstracts from more macroe-
conomic public interest considerations, such as those invoked in recent mergers to
save financial institution whose failure would have created the risk of a dangerous
ripple effect on the financial system.12 It would be interesting to analyze the role of
competition policy in lessening business cycle fluctuations. Political pressures could
be applied to competition authorities to loosen enforcement so as prevent job losses
or plant closures.13 What is the risk that business interests exert undue influence on
competition standards? What are the competition distorting effects of government
aid aimed at lessening the effect of a crisis? These and other interesting questions
remain open for future research.
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